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Determining "Takings" Under Coastal Zone
Management Programs in New York and
Connecticut
I. Introduction
New York and Connecticut have adopted coastal manage-
ment programs encouraged by the amended federal Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 1972.1 In 1979, Connecticut
passed the Coastal Management Act2 and, in 1981, New York
passed the Waterfront Revitalization and Coastal Resources
Act 3 as well as the Shoreowner's Protection Act. 4 These new
acts complement a number of previously enacted statutes,5
thereby giving both states comprehensive programs that ful-
fill the requirements of the federal CZMA.6
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1451-1464 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 22a-90 to 22a-112 (West Supp. 1982).
3. N.Y. Exec. Law § 910-920 (McKinney 1982).
4. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 34-0101 to 34-0113 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
5. In Connecticut see, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-1 to 25-18 (West 1958 &
Supp. 1982) and Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 22a-28 to 22a-45 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982).
In New York see, e.g., N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 13-0101 to 13-0371 (McKinney
1973 & Supp. 1982-1983) and Tidal Wetlands Act, N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 25-
0101 to 25-0601 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
6. Connecticut's program has already been approved by the Office of Coastal
Zone Management (OCZM) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) within the U.S. Department of Commerce. New York's program should be
approved some time in the near future.
The declared policy of the federal CZMA is "to preserve, protect, develop, and
where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone...."
16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (Supp. V 1981). This policy is realized by encouraging and
assisting "states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone
through the development and implementation of [state] management programs....."
16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (Supp. V 1981). Once a state program has been approved by the
Secretary of Commerce, the state becomes eligible for federal grants for up to 80% of
the costs of administering the program. Such approval is predicated upon the state
program meeting various detailed requirements. 16 U.S.C. § 1454, 1455 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
All federal actions within the coastal zone of the state must be consistent with
the approved state program. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c). The CZMA is an example of federal
environmental legislation which puts the regulatory responsibility and burden on
the states. Cf. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. V 1981). Although state
1
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The extensive coastlines of both states are covered by
these programs. New York's coastline is over 3,200 miles long,
and has been defined to include the shorelines of "lakes Erie
and Ontario, the St. Lawrence and Niagara rivers, the Hud-
son river south of the federal dam at Troy, the East river, the
Harlem river, the Kill Von Kull and Arthur Kill, Long Island
sound and the Atlantic ocean, and their connecting water
bodies, bays, harbors, shallows and marshes."7 Connecticut's
coastline encompasses the shoreline of the state's thirty-six
coastal municipalities fronting Long Island Sound.8
Along these coastlines "coastal areas" have been defined;
and within the coastal areas "coastal boundaries" have been
defined. 9 It is within these coastal boundaries that the two
state programs have the power to regulate and limit economic
development of privately owned land. The scope of the land
use constraints enacted in these programs depends in part
upon whether the regulation is so onerous as to be a "taking"
that requires compensation. 10 For example, should the denial
of a permit to develop or exploit coastal wetlands be consid-
ered a taking or merely a proper exercise of the state's police
power? The highest courts in both New York and Connecticut
have adopted different approaches to this problem.
II. Connecticut's Approach
The leading case on the taking issue in Connecticut is
Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental
Protection." Although this case was decided prior to the
participation is voluntary, once a state adopts and has approved a management
program, that program regulates all activity within the state's coastal zone-
including activity by the federal government. Both the federal grants and this
consistency provision provide the main incentives for states to adopt a program.
7. N.Y. Exec. Law § 911(3); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 34-0103(4).
8. Coastal Management Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-94(a).
9. N.Y. Exec. Law § 911(1), (2); Coastal Management Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 22a-94(a), (b).
10. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, art.I, § 7(a), of the
New York Constitution, and art.I, § 11, of the Connecticut Constitution all state that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
11. 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975).
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passage of Connecticut's Coastal Management Act, it is still
applicable to taking issues arising under the state's Coastal
Area Management (CAM) Program. The statute involved in
the case was "An Act Concerning the Preservation of Wet-
lands and Tidal Marsh and Estuarine Systems,"'1 2 which is
now part of the CAM Program.13
In Brecciaroli, the plaintiff was appealing the denial of an
application to fill 5.3 of 17.5 acres of regulated tidal wetlands.
The land in question had already received local approval.1 4
Holding that the denial under the Act was not a taking, the
Connecticut Supreme Court formulated the following test: If
a regulation results in a practical confiscation of property by
restraining the use of the property for "any reasonable pur-
pose," then it is a taking. Each case must be decided on its own
facts, with consideration being given not simply to the dimi-
nution in value of the property but also to the public harm to
be prevented by the regulation and to the alternative uses
available to the property owner. 5
In applying this balancing test, the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that there had been no practical confiscation of
Brecciaroli's property. Although he suffered a diminution in
its value, that diminution was not sufficient to be a taking
when balanced against the public interest in preserving the
state's already threatened wetlands. The court not only stated
that his proposed activity was "presumptively... not reason-
12. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 22a-28 to 22a-45.
13. Both this Act, as recently amended (Preservation of Wetlands Act (West
Supp. 1982)), and the Coastal Management Act require coordination between the
regulatory and permit programs. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-30(c) and § 22a-98.
Further, the Preservation of Wetlands Act was also amended to require that all
regulations that might be adopted under it be consistent with the federal CZMA.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-30(c).
14. If the new Coastal Management Act had been in effect at the time, this local
approval might never have been given. Under the new Act, a coastal site plan for a
proposed activity within the state's coastal zone must be filed with the municipal
zoning commission. Approval of the plan is based not only on the local zoning
ordinances, but also on the adverse impact, if any, of the activity on coastal resources.
Further, the proposed activity must be consistent with the policies and goals of the
Act. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 22a-92, -105, -106, and -109.
15. 168 Conn. at 357, 362 A.2d at 952.
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able when balanced against the public harm it would cre-
ate,"16 but also stated that absent a clear abuse of discretion
by the Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental Protec-
tion," 'the welfare of the public, rather than private gain, is a
paramount consideration ..... "17
The court felt that the denial of the application prohib-
ited only one specific use of the property. Brecciaroli could
still apply for a permit to fill a lesser area of the wetlands,
conduct other regulated activities, or make other "reasonable
unregulated use of his land."8 The court did not, however,
consider whether these alternative uses would give any
worthwhile economic return comparable to that which would
have been generated had the permit been granted. In fact, the
court upheld the denial of Brecciaroli's motion to introduce
evidence as to this issue, and simply concluded that the denial
of the application for the permit was "a proper exercise of the
police power, not amounting to an unconstitutional
taking... ."19
III. New York's Approach
The New York Court of Appeals took a different approach
to the taking issue in Spears v. Berle.20 The plaintiff in this
case sought an order directing the Commissioner of Environ-
mental Conservation to either issue a permit for mining
humus, sand, and stone from freshwater wetlands regulated
by the Freshwater Wetlands Act l1 or to initiate condemnation
proceedings.22 Although this case involved the Freshwater
Wetlands Act, its reasoning should be applicable to cases
involving coastal zone regulation. The Court of Appeals, in
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Corsino v. Grover, 148 Conn. 299, 311, 170 A.2d 267, 273
(1961)).
18. 168 Conn. at 356, 362 A.2d at 952.
19. Id. at 358, 362 A.2d at 953.
20. 48 N.Y.2d 254, 397 N.E.2d 1304 (1979).
21. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 24-0101 to 24-1305 (McKinney Supp. 1982-
1983).
22. See N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 24-0705(7).
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formulating its test for when a land use regulation constitutes
a taking, stated that the test applies to any "land use regula-
tion-be it a universally applicable local zoning ordinance or
a more circumscribed measure governing only certain desig-
nated properties. .. "
The test itself states that a land use regulation is too
onerous, and therefore constitutes a taking, when it" 'renders
the property unsuitable for any reasonable income ... and
thus destroys its economic value, or all but a bare residue of
its value.' "24
This test focuses on the economic destruction of property
rather than on simple diminution of value. An evidentiary
hearing, therefore, is required to examine the effect of the
regulation on the market value of the property. At such a
hearing the complaining property owner must show that a
taking has occurred by producing "dollars and cents" evidence
as to the reduced value of the property. In addition, he must
show that "under no permissible use would the parcel as a
whole be capable of producing a reasonable return or be
adaptable to other suitable private use."2s Since there had
been no such hearing in Spears, the matter was remanded to
the trial court.
IV. Conclusion
The approach adopted by the New York Court of Appeals
contrasts with that of the Connecticut Supreme Court. Al-
though both courts adopted tests that require more than a
mere diminution in value, the New York test is far more
concerned with the economic loss to the landowner.
In both cases, the statutes required a consideration of
"the public health and welfare" before a permit could be
issued.26 Each statute also allowed the reviewing court to hold
23. 48 N.Y.2d at 262, 397 N.E.2d at 1307.
24. Id. at 262, 397 N.E.2d at 1307 (1976). (quoting Fred F. French Investing Co.
v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 596. (1976)).
25. Id. at 263,397 N.E.2d at 1308; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 24-0705(1) and Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-33
(West 1958).
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a denial of an application for a permit to be an unconstitu-
tional taking and to grant appropriate relief.27 The two courts
differed in that the New York Court of Appeals apparently
left the balancing of the public welfare against the individ-
ual's economic harm to the administrative determination of
whether to issue the permit. By contrast, the Connecticut
Supreme Court included that balancing in its own consider-
ation of the taking issue. Essentially, the Connecticut court
appears to be more concerned with the potential harm to the
public while the New York court seems to be more interested
in the economic destruction of the property involved. Because
of this difference in emphasis, the New York court requires an
evidentiary hearing to measure the extent of the economic
loss whereas the Connecticut court does not.
Despite these substantive and procedural differences, the
two approaches might not, in practice, produce such different
results. First, both approaches agree that a practical confisca-
tion is a taking which requires compensation. Second, even
though the New York approach gives the landowner a greater
opportunity to present his case, the burden of proof is so high
that as a practical matter it will be very difficult to prove a
taking in most cases.
Absent an administrative abuse of discretion, the test in
both states requires a showing of an almost complete interfer-
ence in a landowner's property rights before a taking can be
proven. If these cases, which involved regulation of fresh-
water and tidal wetlands, are any guide, it appears that the
new coastal zone legislation will enable each state to effec-
tively regulate land use without being overly burdened by the
requirement of just compensation. Affected landowners, on
the other hand, will have the heavy burden of proving a
practical confiscation.
Steven Chananie, Class of'83
27. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 24-0705(7) and Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 22a-34
(West Supp. 1982).
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